SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

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- I. Soviet campaign for "normalization" of relations with Yugoslavia started after death Stalin but was superficial until late summer '54.
 - A. Since then, Soviets have --

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- 1. Started quoting Yugo press and leaders,
- Stopped and even recalled anti-Tito propaganda (Soviet cultural attache in Paris personally bought up anti-Tito books previously distributed there),
- 3. Paid tribute to Yugo partisans' war role.
- B. Soviet wooing reached new peak at Yugo Embassy's 11th Anniversary party in Moscow (late November) when four top
 Soviet leaders--Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin-not only appeared but also toasted "comrade" Tito and the
 Yugoslav Communist Party.
 - Soviet bigwigs stayed at party over hour, in company
 of Yugo Ambassador almost entire time to point of
 interfering with Ambassador's normal social duties.

2.			

C. Moscow toast was first direct Soviet expression of "approval" toward Yugo "heretics" since split in '48. Was paralleled by unprecedented attendance of ranking Orbit leaders at other Yugo parties.

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- reevaluation earlier efforts in light growing Yugoslav closeness to West. Actions also parallel increase in "amicable" gestures toward number of other countries whose Western ties Moscow hopes to weaken.
 - A. Soviet leaders may hope that wooing of Yugoslavia, which has unique ideological and historical enmity toward USSR, will prove to world "sincerity" of general "co-existence" campaign, thus encouraging neutralism.
 - B. Additional motive -- fanning Western governments' distrust of Tito.
 - C. Some recent moves have approached crucial doctrinal points of Soviet-Yugo dispute--perhaps to test Tito's responses to idea of close but independent future Belgrade-Moscow relationship.
 - D. USSR's program, in long-term aspect, however, still probably envisions day, possibly after Tito's death, when an obedient Yugoslavia might be brought back into Orbit.
- III. Yugo reaction to wooing is in accord with basic desire for "position of independence" between West and Orbit. Co-operation with "both sides" gives Yugos both Western economic and military aid and restored political respect in Orbit.
 - A. As clarification Yugo position, Tito has publicly and privately stated he will not "go back to Moscow," has called such talk "arrant nonsense."
 - 1. Has specified Yugo will not cut arms budget, will continue development Balkan Alliance.

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- B. Yugos view wooing as victory for their own post-'48 policy-have left initiative to USSR.
- C. Yugo reciprocity includes such actions as okaying Soviet 25X1X7 commercial overflights to Albania.
 - D. Yugo doctrine sees Soviet aggression threat diminished, because cold war has arrived at "equilibrium of power."

 Yugos state that Soviets have adopted a real policy of "relaxing tension" in Europe and this represents another reversal of Stalinism forced on Soviet leaders by internal difficulties.
 - E. Within this context, Yugos want West to negotiate with USSR on problems of international concern, at same time developing unity and maintaining legitimate defense efforts.
 - IV. For future, can expect that Yugo self-interest will preclude return to Orbit.
 - A. Present position gives Yugo virtual Western guarantee of national security, plus military, economic aid, without infringement on Yugo independence or internal affairs.
 - B. Return to Orbit would destroy Tito's hopes for increased prestige with West European Socialist parties and with "neutral" countries: example -- his current trip to India.
 - C. Although Yugos see indications—such as withdrawal from Satellite joint companies—that USSR intends less interference with Satellites, they still distrust USSR enough to discount any Sovjet Offer 5P79R00890A60040640033-3 Approved For Release 2002/09/04 Offer 5P79R00890A60040640033-3 might promise a relationship as independent as Peiping's.

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D. Meanwhile, no signs that Tito given any concrete offer of formal reentry into Bloc. Moscow probably expects Tito would reject anything it was willing to offer.

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